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Notes and Comments
THE NEGLIGENT MURDER IN KENTUCKY
The negligent murder, although seldom so designated by the
courts, has been recognized and dealt with by them through several
centuries.' This is a crime predicated on conduct most correctly
described as "conduct creating such an unreasonable risk of harm to
the lives and safety of others as to be wantonly disregardful of such
interests."2
It is submitted at the outset that the negligent murder is not
recognized in Kentucky, although there are a few cases which at first
blush indicate the contrary. The strongest of these is Guinn v. Com-
monwealth.3 There the facts reported are sparse and the opinion
practically non-existent, but it would seem that the fatal shot was
fired by one of a group of rowdy, drunken men engaged in an in-
discriminate firing of their pistols, jeopardizing the lives of all who
were in range of their shots. Decedent, intoxicated and unaware of the
danger, was riding along the road on his horse when he was hit by a
stray bullet. The murder conviction affirmed by the court would ap-
pear to be a case of negligent murder, but whether the court con-
sidered it as such is impossible to tell.
In Golliher v. Commonwealth,4 the deefndant, bent on killing "four
'Halloway's Case, 1 Cro. Car. 131, 79 Eng. Rep. 715 (1628) where a park
keeper tied a young boy to a horse's tail and whipped the horse, resulting in the
boy's being dragged to death; Hulls Case, Ke I. 40, 84 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1644)
where a laborer threw a stone from a roof, killing one below, the English court
rendered dictum to the effect that had this occurred in a London street, it would
have been murder; Castell v. Bambridge, 2 Strange 854 (1730), where a warden
unnecessarily took a prisoner to a house in which there was a case of smallpox,
knowing the fact and knowing the prisoner had never had the disease, by reason of
which the prisoner died; Mayes v. People, 106 IMI. 306 (1883) where a drunken
husband angrily threw a beer mug at his wife, the mug striking an oil lamp which
she was carrying, starting a fire, and burning up the wife; Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz.
346, 170 A. 869 (1918) officer shooting at tires to stop a car killed occupant; Bank
v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 665, 211 S.W. 217 (1919), defendant fired into a freight
train, killing the brakeman; Reed v. State, 225 Ala. 219, 142 So. 441 (1932), in-
toxicated defendant driving on a public street at an excessive speed, striking and
killing a pedestrian. Other auto cases include State v. Shepherd, 171 Minn. 414,
214 N.W. 280 (1927); State v. Trott, 190 N. C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925). Also
see 1 Hale P. C. 476 (1778) where wilfully riding an unruly and vicious horse into
a crowd and one of the crowd is killed, was murder. And see STEPHEN, DiGEST OF
THE CIamNAL LAW, art. 223 (1877) and HoLMEs, THE CO01,ON LAw, 55-56
(1881).
'MoELAND, A RATIONALE OF CamnNAL NEGLIGENCE, 65 n. 221 (1949).
11 Ky. L. Rep. 615 (1889). Cited as Quinn v. Comm. in 12 S.W. 672.
'2 Duval (Ky.) 163 (1865).
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damned rascals," entered a building full of people, his gun shouldered
and the muzzle pointing behind him. The gun went off, killing a
friend. The court said:
"If defendant had gone into the house for the felonious purpose
of killing any person, and had he voluntarily fired his gun for the
purpose of executing that malicious design, the killing of his friend
Rowe, though unintended, would, nevertheless, have been murder.
Or had he, without any such special purpose, voluntarily' and reck-
lessly fired in the crowd and killed Rowe, or any other person, he
would have been guilty of murder."
The first sentence in the above quoted opinion may be a reference
either to the doctrine of transferred intent 6 or to the felony murder
doctrine. 7 That the second sentence is descriptive of the negligent
murder may be argued, but, considering the facts, it is believed that
the court is referring to that type of conduct which produces a degree
of danger whereby death is substantially certain to follow. Such is
not negligence, but intent as a matter of law.8 Similarly in Brown v.
Commonwealth where defendant intentionally fired his pistol in a
crowded room, the court said that even though the defendant had no
design to kill, but merely sought diversion, if he killed anyone, it was
murder.
In Hill v. Commonwealth0 the defendant, a traffic policeman,
allegedly shot at the tires of a speeding car whose driver did not
respond to his command to stop. One of the five occupants of the car
was killed by the bullet. In reversing a murder conviction the court
prescribed the following instruction for the next trial:
"(2) If ... defendant . . . wilfully, feloniously and with malice
aforethought aimed and fired his pistol into the automobile ... when
he knew or had reason to believe that there were persons therein
.... you will find him guilty of murder and fix his punishment at
death or confinement in the state penitentiary for life...
(3) If ... defendant.., shot at the casing... and thereby shot and
killed [deceased] ... by the reckless or grossly careless handling or
shooting of the pistol ... although he did not intend to shoot [de-
ceased] you will find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter
." (writer's italics)
Writer's Italics
'Where A delivers poisoned whiskey to B with intent to kill B, but B gives
the whiskey to C, who dies as a result of drinking it, A's intent to kill B will be
transferred to C. Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250, 190 So. 520 (1939).
'One who, in the perpetration of a felony, kills a human being may be
guilty of murder though death was unintended. Reddick v. Comm., 17 Ky. L. Rep.
1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895).
'Moreland, op. cit. supra note 2 at 65.
13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (1891).
"239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W. 2d°261 (1931).
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It is believed that these instructions reveal a fairly accurate picture
of the law as it exists in Kentucky. By instruction (2) the court
provides for a conviction of murder, but, as in the Golliher and Brown
cases (both of which the court cited) the court does so only where the
homicide was substantially certain to follow as a result of the act. It
requires that defendant aim his pistol into the automobile. It is re-
iterated that this is not negligent murder. Instruction (8), providing
voluntary manslaughter, resembles an instruction on negligent murder;
but the Kentucky court, not recognizing negligent murder, treats it as
voluntary manslaughter. It appears that such is repeatedly held to be
the law in Kentucky. Under the Kentucky rule voluntary manslaughter
includes that which was designated negligent murder at common
law.11
That the negligent murder is non-existent in this Commonwealth
is thus supported by the fact that no case has been found where the
defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced on an expressly recog-
nized theory of negligent murder. For example, if the above instruc-
tion (2) be considered appropriate* to negligent murder, the punish-
ment prescribed by the court is that set out by Kentucky's only murder
statute, which provides:
"Any person who commits willful murder shall be punished by con-
finement in the penitentiary for life, or by death."'2 (writer's italics).
It is believed that in Kentucky all murder is treated as within this
statute, and consequently the only recognized murder is willful
murder.
In the face of the cases discussed, although it is arguable that the
negligent murder exists in this state, there stands a host of cases
denying in effect the existence of the negligent murder. Thus where
defendant playfully raised his pistol to decedents head and pulled the
trigger harder than he intended, the court said:
".... at common law the killing in this case would be held to be
murder upon the ground that malice was implied . .. But the doc-
trine of implied malice does not obtain in Kentucky' . . . Yet it
'
1This argument is made without any reference to instruction (1), which is
not included in the court's opinion and the court's statement in regard to instruc-
tion (1) is extremely hard to understand. It may be subject to several explanations,
but it appears that the court is including "gross negligence" in its instruction on
murder committed wilfully with malice, thus including gross negligence in the
statutory definition of "wilful murder".Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.010 (1948).
'Two years later in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 652, 131 S.W. 517
(1910), the court said: "Where one recklessly kills another with a deadly weapon,
malice may be implied." From the tenor of the entire opinion, the court must have
meant "intent" where it said "malice."
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does not follow that ...the shooting here was involuntary man-
slaughter ...When we reject the doctrine of implied malice ...
the offense which would otherwise be murder becomes voluntary
manslaughter ... Accordingly . . . in Kentucky ... where one kills
another by wanton, reckless, and grossly careless use of firearms, the
offense, if without malice aforethought is voluntary manslaughter, al-
though he had no intention to kill."
The court expresses a like attitude in the automobile homicide
cases. Thus where a speeding motorist struck and killed a child re-
turning from school, after stating the law in regard to firearms and
deadly weapons, the court said:
"Automobiles ...are not to be classed in the same category with
deadly weapons, but if. .. the driver... operates such vehicle...
in a manner ... reasonably calculated to injure others using the
highway, and under such circumstances reckless, wantonly, and with
gross carelessness strikes and kills another, this constitutes voluntary
manslaughter.""'
In cases other than those involving guns and automobiles the Ken-
tucky court has held that conduct negligent in the degree described as
"reckless, wanton, and grossly careless" resulting in death is voluntary
manslaughter. The court has been quite consistent in its use of these
descriptive words,16 and the degree of negligence required seems to be
firmly and clearly established. In King v. CommonwealthV7 the court
said:
"If the refusal to permit a wounded person to obtain aid or medical
attention, or to render it where the duty to render it exists, is so
"Ewing v. Com., 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W. 352 (1908). Accord: Vires v. Com.,
308 Ky. 707, 215 S.W. 2d 837 (1948); Shoupe v. Com., 294 Ky. 254, 171 S.W. 2d
447 (1943); Thacker v. Com., 263 Ky. 97, 91 S.W. 2d 998 (1936); Com. v.
Anderson, 239 Ky. 658, 40 S.W. 2d 265 (1931); Smiley v. Com., 235 Ky. 735, 32
S.W. 2d 51 (1930); Jones and Overton v. Com., 200 Ky. 65, 252 S.W. 130 (1923);
Lambdin v. Com., 195 Ky. 87, 241 S.W. 842 (1922); Hunn v. Com., 143 Ky. 143,
136 S.W. 144 (1911); McGeorge v. Com., 145 Ky. 540, 140 S.W. 691 (1911);
Smith v. Com., 133 Ky. 532, 118 S.W. 368 (1909); Montgomery v. Com., 26 Ky.
L. R. 356, 81 S.W. 264 (1904); Sparks v. Com., 3 Bush (Ky.) 111 (1891); Lewis
Walls v. Com., 12 Ky. Opin. 687 (1884); York v. Com., 83 Ky. 360 (1884);
Chrystal v. Com., 9 Bush (Ky.) 669 (1878). All these cases involve the "wanton,
reckless, and grossly careless use of firearms," and the court consistently describes
the negligence requisite for voluntary manslaughter in just those words.
' Jones v. Com., 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926). Accord: Hunt v. Com.,
289 Ky. 527, 159 S.W. 2d 23 (1942); Carnes v. Com., 278 Ky. 771, 129 S.W. 2d
543 (1939); Swango v. Com., 276 Ky. 467, 124 S.W. 2d 768 (1939); Largent v.
Com., 265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W. 2d 538 (1936); Dublin v. Com., 260 Ky. 412, 86
S.W. 2d 136 (1935); King v .Com., 253"Ky. 775, 70 S.W. 2d 667 (1934); Colvin
v. Com., 247 Ky. 480, 57 S.W. 2d 487 (1933); Elkins v. Com., 244 Ky. 583, 51
S.W. 2d 916 (1932).
The consistency is only as to the use of these terms in describing voluntary
manslaughter. Admittedly these same words, although not used c6njunctively (and
perhaps with the exception of "wanton") have been used singularly along with
other words commonly indicative of lesser degrees of negligence in describing such
lesser degrees.
" 285 Ky. 654, 148 S.W. 2d 1044 (1941).
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grossly negligent or reckless as to manifest a wanton disregard for
human life, rather than a specific intent to bring about the death of
the specific individual, the offenders may be guilty of voluntary
manslaughter."'
And so, where several friends were sitting around a hearth fire and
the defendant, with no apparent reason, threw blasting powder into
the fire and the ensuing explosion set fire to the house, burning to
death two people and even injuring the defendant, the court affirmed
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter on the ground that it was
properly a question for the jury whether the defendant's act was
wanton and reckless. 19 In Gibson v. Commonwealth" the defendant
left her two-month old bastard child lying in a basket in the front yard
of a Louisville home, hoping someone would find it. The night was a
cold, raw one, and the child had nothing but a shawl covering it. The
next morning it was found dead. In affirming a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter, the court did not use the words "wanton", "reckless",
or "grossly careless", but said that if defendant without malice "unlaw-
fully, willfully and feloniously" did the act, even if done with the hope
that the child would be taken care of before it should freeze to death,
she was guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
The conclusion is that the Kentucky court, even as it has expressly
said,21 uniformly holds as voluntary manslaughter that which would be
negligent murder at common law, there being no intent or design to
kill 2 It is unnecessary to inquire how or why Kentucky arrived at
this position 2 3 but the rationalization frequently employed is simply
that the defendant intended the natural consequence of his act.24
"This argument falls before the fact that negligence, however gross, is
never intent; and it is unnecessary since the crime of involuntary man-
Ibid, 659, S.W. at 1047.19Embry v. Com., 236 Ky. 204, 32 S.W. 2d 979 (1930).
m
-106 Ky. 360,50 S.W. 532 (1899).
Ewing v. Com., supra note 14.
As to whether design or purpose to kill is necessary to voluntary man-
slaughter, the authorities differ. All agree that the act must have been voluntary.
26 AM. Jmui. 168. 178 (1940).
' It may be that the present status was reached because of an unwillingness
on the part of the Kentucky court to convict of murder in a negligence case. At the
same time the court may have been unwilling to convict of only involuntary man-
slaughter, which, in Kentucky, is treated as a common-law misdemeanor, punish-
able-prior to a 1950 statute (see note 26 infra)-by fine or imprisonment in the
county jail, or both, without limit. Sikes v. Com., 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W. 2d 956
(1947); Cottrell v. Com., 271 Ky. 52, 111 S.W. 2d 445 (1937); Spriggs v. Com.,
113 Ky. 724, 68 S.W. 1087 (1902).
' Bates v. Com., 307 Ky. 357, 211 S.W. 2d 130 (1948); Largent v. Com., 265
Ky. 598, 97 S.W. 2d 538 (1936); Davis v. Com., 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W. 24
(1922).
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slaughter was designed to cover negligent homicide not amounting to
murder."25
The question now emerges: What, if anything, should Kentucky
do in regard to her position as to the negligent murder?
It is submitted that the continuance of the anomalous negligent
voluntary manslaughter might well be advocated, first, as a practical
matter, since it is believed that the result in most, if not all, cases has
been substantially the same as would have been reached under the
use of the negligent murder doctrine. In fact, it is arguable that more
convictions may be had under the negligent voluntary manslaughter.
Secondly, as has been indicated, the Kentucky anomaly is well estab-
lished and has been consistently defined. Admittedly Kentucky's posi-
tion is illogical and unnecessary, but where the result is satisfactory and
the law settled, unnecessary change may be more injurious than ad-
vantageous.
On the other hand, it may be argued that where anomalies and
fictions are unnecessary in reaching a proper result, they should be
discarded as being conducive only to confusion; that the malignant
conduct involved in this type of case merits the stigma of murder
rather than the brand of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter;
and that a more severe penalty might be desired than that allowed
under the voluntary manslaughter. Consequently under this argu-
ment the negligent voluntary manslaughter should be abolished and
the negligent murder adopted. There would be nothing to prevent
the court from embracing it as a common law crime, but such would
not be feasible in view of the 1950 Kentucky statute providing:
"Any person convicted of a common-law offense the penalty for
which is not otherwise provided by statute shall be imprisoned in the
county jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum
not exceeding five thousand dollars or both.""
If the negligent murder is to be revived in this state, the expedient
method is by statute.
In view of existing uncertainty in the entire field of negligent
homicide, 27 it is believed that Kentucky should have general statutory
'Note 39, Ky. L. J. 351, 352 (1951). As previously indicated, there is a type
of conduct where the results are substantially certain to follow, and intent will be
inferred. That is to say, defendant's conduct is considered as equivalent to intent
whether intent exists or not. Such a homicide is willful murder, however.
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.075 (1948).
'This uncertainty exists, of course, largely because of the indiscriminate use
of the same words in defining the degrees of negligence requisite for different
grades of homicide. Until the recent case of Marye v. Com., 240 S.W. 2d 852
(1951), the expressions of the Kentucky Court, with but few exceptions (Carnes
v. Com., 278 Ky. 771, 129 S.W. 2d 543 (1939)) have been to the effect that ordi-
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reform on the subject. Consequently, although there may be certain
practical advantages in retaining the negligent voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the better course is to include the negligent murder as part of a
statute covering the entire field of negligent homicide. This statute
should cover negligent murder and negligent involuntary man-
slaughter,28 and it should define and distinguish as precisely as pos-
sible the greater and lesser degrees of negligence required for the
respective crimes. Language should be used which will sufficiently
inform a jury that the degree of negligence in involuntary manslaugh-
ter is greater than ordinary civil negligence, and less than that extreme
degree of negligence requisite to a conviction of murder. Also, it is
likewise imperative that such a statute establish an appropriate stand-
ard of care for negligent murder. This negligence is of the highest de-
gree, that type of conduct which at common law is said to evince a
depraved mind and a heart devoid of social duty.29
Wu.um RICE
THE MISDEMEANOR-MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE
IN KENTUCKY
Bracton apparently originated the general proposition that where
life has been taken in the commission of an unlawful act the slayer
is guilty of culpable homicide notwithstanding the death was unin-
tentional; or, stated differently, that an unintentional homicide can in
no case be held misadventure unless it happened in the commission
nary negligence is sufficient for involuntary manslaughter. Lewis v. Com., 801 Ky.
269, 191 S.W. 2d 416 (1945); Com. v. Mullins, 296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W. 2d 403
(1943); King v. Com., 285 Ky. 654, 148 S.W. 2d 1044 (1941); Cornett v. Com.,
282 Ky. 322, 138 S.W. 2d 492 (1940); Embry v. Com., 236 Ky. 204, 32 S.W. 2d
979 (1980). In the Marye case the court said that voluntary manslaughter should
require a finding of reckless and wanton conduct and that involuntary manslaughter
should require a finding of gross negligence. Note that the court used the ad-jective gross, whereas it has used the same adjective in describing voluntary man-
slaughter in practically all cases. Of course, this is confusing, but the court made
some progress in expressly overruling all cases approving a conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter on a finding of no more than ordinary negligence.
'Perhaps it should be pointed out that some 34 states have incorporated
within their statutory law of homicide a crime designated as "negligent homicide."
It covers homicide in the operation of a motor vehicle, its object apparently being
to get more convictions. If such a statute be deemed expedient, it is suggested
that it not preclude convictions under the ordinary negligent murder or negligent
involuntary manslaughter.
' The state of mind in the negligent murder has been variously described as
"general malignity of heart", "the heart regardless of social duty and deliberately
bent on mischief," "a wicked, depraved, and maligant heart," etc. See note 28 Ky.
L. J. 53 (1939) and citations therein.
